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Introduction
In a changing global environmental governance context, the frontiers of gover-
nance innovations are ever-shifting. In an evolving kaleidoscope of innovations,
one deserves more sustained scrutiny than it has received to date, given its ubiq-
uitous presence in global environmental governance. This is the phenomenon
of “governance by transparency” or governance by information disclosure.
Transparency is widely associated with more accountable, legitimate, demo-
cratic and effective governance, partly based on an assumption that transpar-
ency can empower those at its receiving end.1
Such associations and assumptions require much more sustained scru-
tiny.2 In the global environmental domain, transparency is being embraced by
various actors as a norm, a procedural principle and/or mechanism of gover-
nance. As noted in the introduction to this special issue, disclosure of informa-
tion—as one manifestation of a transparency trend—is central to numerous
governance initiatives. Yet diverse normative rationales underpin this embrace
of transparency and it is promoted by multiple actors to serve distinct and often
conºicting ends.3
It has become imperative to analyze transparency as a key political arena
where ongoing conºicts over norms, practices and objectives of global environ-
* My thanks to Frank Biermann, Michael Mason, Arthur Mol, Roberto Pereira-Guimaraes,
Dimitris Stevis, two GEP anonymous reviewers and fellow participants in the Transparency in
Global Environmental Governance Workshop at Wageningen University for their helpful com-
ments on an earlier version of this article.
1. For the perils and promises of transparency in global governance, and its posited links to ac-
countability, legitimacy and effectiveness, see Fung et al. 2007; Graham 2002; Keohane 2006;
and Mitchell 1998.
2. The introduction and epilogue of this issue highlight travails and triumphs of transparency in
global environmental governance, see Gupta 2010b; and Mol 2010.
3. On this, see also Gupta 2008; Mason 2008; and Florini 2008.
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mental governance take place, even as it becomes important to consider
whether transparency can itself be a transformative force in reshaping such prac-
tices and dynamics.4 Writings on transparency in a global environmental con-
text have ranged from a liberal institutionalist and functionalist view that “more
and better information” can aid in effective international environmental coop-
eration,5 to more constructivist perspectives that analyze information itself as
an arena of political conºict rather than as a means to rationalize such con-
ºicts.6 Drawing on this latter perspective, one key question is not so much
whether transparency can ameliorate information asymmetries in order to pro-
mote more rational outcomes, but whether it can reconªgure existing power
asymmetries and hence be transformative.
With such a concern as its point of departure, this article analyzes gover-
nance by transparency in global biosafety politics. Ensuring biosafety, or safe
trade in genetically modiªed organisms (GMOs), remains a controversial global
risk governance challenge, one where the very existence of risk and harm re-
mains contested. The implications of relying on governance by disclosure in
such a normatively and scientiªcally contested global political arena are partic-
ularly important to consider.
I focus here on governance by disclosure in the global regime of the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, negotiated under the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity (CBD). The Cartagena Protocol seeks to govern safe transboundary
transfer and use of GMOs. It advances the notion of “advance informed agree-
ment” of an importing country as the central mechanism through which to mit-
igate potential harm resulting from trade in GMOs. Advance informed agree-
ment derives from the longer established notion of “prior informed consent,”
used in the international realm to govern trade in risky substances such as haz-
ardous wastes and restricted chemicals. Prior informed consent is intended to
be a compromise between two alternative (and more extreme) policy options:
an outright ban on trade as a way to avoid harm, versus a caveat emptor or “let
the buyer beware” approach where the onus to know about and avoid harm
rests solely with a buyer.7 Yet the policy compromise of prior informed consent
is far from widely shared, as becomes clear from conºicts over institutionalizing
the disclosure obligations that lie at the heart of it.
In this article, I analyze disclosure relating to global GMO transfers as it is
being institutionalized within the Cartagena Protocol regime and the aims and
beneªciaries of such disclosure in practice. This assessment requires, ªrst and
foremost, a more systematic delineation of the various aims that disclosure is
presumed to further. Such aims can be broadly conceptualized as normative,
procedural and substantive. Disclosure may seek to further, ªrst, a normative
right to know of recipients as an end in and of itself; second, it may seek to fur-
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ther various procedural ends, such as enhanced participation or choice of recipi-
ents, or enhanced accountability of disclosers; and ªnally, disclosure may seek
to further substantive ends such as environmental improvements, sustainable re-
source use or risk reduction. If so, an assessment of how governance by disclo-
sure is working (its “effectiveness”) needs to consider not only substantive out-
comes but also its normative and procedural effects.8
The aims of prior informed consent—as one manifestation of governance
by disclosure—can also be similarly categorized. Normatively, prior informed
consent seeks to further a right to know about transfers of risky substances (for
those at the receiving end of such transfers); procedurally, it aims to enhance in-
formed choice (and hence empower) recipients; and substantively, it seeks to
ensure oversight and risk mitigation relating to the GMO trade. In this highly
contested policy domain, however, such governance aims are by no means con-
sensual. For those advocating globally for market access for GMOs (that is,
GMO producers and exporters), the aims to be pursued by prior informed con-
sent relate more to evidence-based efªcient decision-making so as to facilitate
trade, rather than ensuring recipient right to know and choose as a means to po-
tentially restrict trade. Prior informed consent’s governance aims can thus be in-
terpreted in potentially contradictory ways.9
This reinforces the point made above that remains a key site for contesta-
tion over the broader norms and objectives of global risk governance. Analyzing
how information disclosure is being institutionalized within this global regime
can reveal whose normative, procedural and substantive aims are furthered by
disclosure, and the implications for the oft-alleged potential of transparency to
empower.
Although there are various information disclosure obligations in the
Cartagena Protocol, I focus here on the most contested aspect of disclosure in
this context: the nature and scope of information to accompany GMO varieties
contained in the bulk agricultural commodity trade. Through detailed analysis
of the scope and relevance of disclosure relating to such trade, three arguments
are advanced. First, I argue that, contrary to promoting informed choice of im-
porting countries, the current limited disclosure institutionalized within this
global regime ensures that a norm of caveat emptor in fact prevails with regard to
GMOs in agricultural trade. The Protocol does not require disclosure of speciªc
and new information regarding GMO varieties in agricultural commodity ship-
ments, and hence fails to operationalize a normative right to know about trans-
fers of risk, as demanded by recipients. The limited scope of disclosure also en-
sures that disclosers’ (that is, GMO producers and exporters) existing market
practices do not have to change. As a result, I argue that disclosure relating to the
GMO trade as mandated in this global governance context is market following
rather than market forcing.
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Furthermore, in order for recipients to put limited disclosed information
to use, the onus rests on them to put into place complex infrastructures of sam-
pling, testing and veriªcation of disclosed information. I argue that such “infra-
structures of transparency” are increasingly central to governance by disclosure,
giving rise to new forms and loci of authority. Whether such new forms of au-
thority ameliorate or exacerbate informational and power asymmetries (and
whose governance aims they further) is a crucial issue meriting further concep-
tual and empirical inquiry.
Meanwhile, those unable to “make transparency work” for them via such
infrastructures of testing and veriªcation have to contend either with caveat emp-
tor or else resort to alternative regulatory tools such as bans in order to meet
their substantive goals of risk reduction. As a result, I conclude that the poten-
tial of transparency to empower is yet to be realized in this area, particu-
larly for the poorest developing countries most reliant on globally-induced
disclosure.
In developing these arguments, the article ªrst details the political negotia-
tions and conºicts around the scope of disclosure relating to the global GMO
commodity trade. I then analyze the consequences of the Protocol’s current
disclosure obligations and practices for the normative, procedural and substan-
tive aims that transparency furthers. The analysis is based upon participant ob-
servation of Cartagena Protocol negotiations and primary and secondary
sources.
Negotiating the Boundaries of Disclosure: Actors and Scope
Disclosure relating to GMOs traded globally for use as food, feed or for process-
ing (agricultural commodities) remains one of the central axes of conºict
within the Cartagena Protocol. Agricultural commodities account for the vast
majority of globally traded GMOs and the economic stakes are high, given that
GMO-related disclosure will have important implications for the multibillion
dollar global agricultural commodity trade. Of the most heavily traded com-
modity crops, four have a growing number of GMO varieties (soybean, maize,
canola and cotton).10 Of these, the ªrst three are widely used for animal feed,
food and in a vast array of processed foods. Genetically modiªed varieties of
other important globally traded food crops such as wheat and rice are also in
different stages of testing and commercialization.11
Although agricultural commodities are imported by a large number of
countries, their export—and the export of genetically modiªed (GM) varieties
of such commodities in particular—is limited to relatively few countries. These
include the United States (with roughly 50 percent of all GM production and
trade), Canada, Australia, Argentina, Brazil and China (these latter three coun-
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tries account for almost 90 percent of all GM crops grown in developing coun-
tries).12 Key importers of bulk agricultural commodities include the European
Union (EU), Japan, Mexico, China, South Africa, and many other countries in
the global South.
Following contentious negotiations among these key players, the 2000
Cartagena Protocol called for a two-stage disclosure obligation relating to the
global GMO trade.13 As a ªrst step, as soon as a commercial variety of a geneti-
cally modiªed crop receives domestic approval in a country of production, this
is to be reported to an online Biosafety Clearing House (BCH) within 15 days of
approval being granted.14 The second step calls for exporters to disclose certain
information along with agricultural commodity shipments, once underway. I
focus here on this latter step. Here, the 2000 agreement requires agricultural
commodity shipments with GMO varieties to be accompanied by a declaration
that they “may contain” GMOs (rather than declaring that they “contain”
GMOs and specifying which ones, as demanded by the EU and most developing
countries). An initial coalition of GMO producing countries consisting of the
US, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay vigorously opposed this
demand for more speciªc disclosure in lead-up to Protocol adoption in 2000,
because it would have required mandatory segregation of GM from non-GM va-
rieties in the agricultural commodity chain, and would thus be expensive and
trade disruptive in their view. Their only concession was to agree to revisit the is-
sue two years after entry into force of the Protocol.15
Disclosure about GMO varieties in agricultural trade has remained a
prominent global arena where conºict between shifting and evolving coalitions
of GMO exporting and importing countries continues to play out. An important
dynamic shaping disclosure in this global context is that the axis of conºict is
not along North/South lines. Instead, the main dynamic is between GMO ex-
porting and importing countries, and each of these categories includes both de-
veloped and developing countries. Furthermore, two global economic power-
houses fall on either side of this main axis of conºict, with the European Union
(often allied with Japan and a majority of developing countries, particularly in
Africa) consistently articulating the GMO importer perspective, and the US and
allies such as Canada, Australia and Argentina consistently articulating the
GMO exporter perspective. Unlike in other cases of governance by disclosure,
where the “powerful” might have to disclose to the “less powerful,” here a trans-
atlantic divide of power shapes norms and practices of disclosure.
Added to this are the evolving positions of some large developing and
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OECD countries, such as Brazil, China, South Africa, New Zealand and Mexico,
which are either both exporting and importing countries (China, South Africa)
or are concerned about impact on their non-GMO agricultural exports (New
Zealand)16 or about trade relationships with GMO exporters (Mexico).17 It is in
the realm of shifting global agricultural trade relationships between these key
players that the norms and practices of disclosure are hashed out.
A second important dynamic shaping disclosure in this context is the
Party/non-Party to the Protocol status of these key players, given that most ex-
porting countries (such as the United States, Canada, Argentina and Australia)
are not currently Parties to the Protocol, while most of those articulating im-
porter perspectives (including the European Union and most developing coun-
tries) are Parties. Furthermore, those with competing and shifting interests
(whether exporter or importer) such as Brazil, Mexico, New Zealand, China and
South Africa, are Parties as well. As one illustration, Brazil wears three hats in
this global context: developing country, Party to the Protocol, and exporter. This
requires a balancing act to support other developing countries’ demands for
stringent disclosure, while ensuring that it can itself comply with disclosure ob-
ligations as an exporter and not be at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis
(other) exporting non-Parties who are not legally obliged to comply.
Following another six years of acrimonious negotiations among shifting
coalitions of exporting and importing countries, additional disclosure require-
ments agreed in 2006 call for agricultural commodity shipments that contain
“identity preserved GMOs” to declare that they “contain” GMOs. All others, for
whom no identity preservation systems exist, still require only a “may contain”
declaration.18 Further negotiations on this are now postponed to 2012. Until
such time, exporting countries can also use an existing commercial invoice to
disclose information, as pushed for by these countries, rather than a “stand-
alone” document, desired by importers, which would draw special attention to
GMO presence in a given shipment.19
Additional disclosure requirements for shipments still labeled “may con-
tain” include a list of GMO varieties that may be in a shipment, including their
scientiªc, common and/or commercial names, as well as a unique identiªer
code (a numeric code associated with each genetic transformation), if known.
Unique identiªers, developed by the OECD, have been promoted by the EU to
facilitate tracking and testing for presence of speciªc GMO events in individual
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shipments. Finally, the 2006 agreement speciªes that “the expression ‘may con-
tain’ does not require listing of living modiªed organisms of species other than
those that constitute the shipment.”20 Thus a maize shipment would not require
listing of genetically modiªed soybean varieties that might be inadvertently
present. This caveat has important implications for thorny discussions relating
to adventitious presence of GMOs in trade (that is, unavoidable presence of
trace quantities of GMO varieties other than those known/intended to be in a
shipment).
I turn next to the implications of these disclosure obligations for both ex-
porting and importing countries, and the normative, procedural and substan-
tive goals that they may further.
Transparency as Contested Terrain: Whose Right to Know What and
Why?
This section analyzes to whom it matters (and why) that shipments of bulk agri-
cultural commodities need to declare that they “may contain” GMOs, and other
agreed aspects of disclosure. I ªrst consider whether an importing country’s nor-
mative right to know about GMO transfers is institutionalized by such disclo-
sure, and whether information disclosers’ practices have to change in order to
comply. I then analyze the infrastructures of testing and veriªcation that in-
creasingly accompany such disclosure. The ªnal section revisits the question of
“transparency for whom” by examining the relevance of these disclosure obliga-
tions for different categories of importing countries, given their diverse domes-
tic GMO governance goals.
Transparency as Right to Know: Disclosing Sufªcient New Information?
Disclosure stating that bulk agricultural commodity shipments “may contain”
GMO varieties, as well as a list of which ones may be in a shipment and their
common and scientiªc names, certainly goes beyond no such information be-
ing provided (the status quo in the absence of the Protocol). In assessing the
implications of such disclosure for an importing country’s desire to know about
GMO transfers vís-a-vís an exporting country’s desire to minimize market re-
strictions, two points are made below: ªrst, the information required to be dis-
closed is vague; and second, no new information needs to be generated by
disclosers to meet these obligations.
First, a disclosure obligation that shipments “may contain” GMOs is, as it
sounds, imprecise. Essentially, it requires that any bulk shipment of a commod-
ity state that it “may contain” any of the GM varieties of that commodity that
have been approved and are in commercial production within an exporting
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country. It does not require disclosure of speciªc varieties or quantities that are
present (as noted, such speciªcity would require segregation of GM from non-
GM varieties and between GM varieties—which is not current practice in these
countries).
In its vagueness, a “may contain” disclosure requirement simultaneously
reveals too much and too little information. Even as it provides a long list of po-
tential GMO varieties that could be in a shipment, no information is revealed
about which varieties are actually present. This highlights a challenge of relying
on transparency as a tool of governance—that it can be subverted in practice via
the phenomenon of “drowning in disclosure” or provision of too much infor-
mation, where the relevant is buried in the irrelevant and hard to ªnd, if pro-
vided at all.21
Second, a “may contain” disclosure obligation reveals information that al-
ready exists and is known to exporters. Essentially, any bulk shipment with GM
crop varieties requires such a declaration if shipped from an exporting country
with no segregation between GM and non-GM varieties in place, which holds
for the vast majority of exporting countries. As a result, no new information
needs to be generated. This goes to another key issue in assessing effects of dis-
closure, whether new information has to be generated to comply with disclo-
sure obligations, increasing the likelihood that disclosure will have behavior-
altering consequences.
The fact that no new information is needed to comply with a “may con-
tain” disclosure obligation is reinforced by the caveat in the Protocol’s 2006 de-
cision that, in listing GMOs that may be present in a shipment, only those of the
same species as the commodity being traded need to be listed. Here, again,
the burden of testing for and disclosing possible adventitious presence of
GMOs of other species (information that is not presently known to exporters) is
avoided.
In sum, a disclosure requirement that bulk shipments of commodities
have to be accompanied by a declaration that they “may contain” GMOs is
vague and reveals what is already known to disclosers. Equally important, it
does not shift the burden of responsibility to test for presence of speciªc GMOs
to exporting countries, a key goal pursued by importing countries through gov-
ernance by disclosure. Finally, the means of disclosure agreed here—an existing
commercial invoice rather than stand-alone document—is the least burden-
some for exporters, entailing little change in existing practices and being the
least market restrictive means of complying with disclosure requirements.
A key conclusion is that no established practices have to change in order
for exporting countries to meet GMO disclosure obligations. According to in-
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dustry analyses, disclosing more detailed information such as which GMO vari-
eties are actually present in a shipment, is impossible to realize currently, given
how agricultural commodity trade is organized.22 Such disclosure would require
mandatory segregation of GMO from non-GM varieties (and between GM vari-
eties) and elaborate testing at various points in the commodity chain, with the
onus to do so resting on exporting countries. Instead of segregation, however,
co-mingling is still the mainstay of business in GMO producing countries, a
process whereby grain from multiple sources is mixed at different points, con-
stantly changing the ratio of genetically modiªed to non-modiªed varieties in
any given grain shipment.23
From an importing country perspective, however, the imprecise “may con-
tain” declaration does not reveal relevant and usable information needed in or-
der to be sufªciently informed about GMOs entering a country’s borders24; nor
does it facilitate meeting related procedural and substantive domestic GMO
governance aims such as consumer choice, labeling, traceability and food safety,
all of which—to varying degrees—may require greater speciªcity.25
A ªnal point to be considered here is the additional disclosure obligation,
agreed with much fanfare in 2006, to state (for those genetically modiªed or-
ganisms for which identity preserved varieties exist) that they “contain” GMOs.
At ªrst glance, this appears to be a signiªcant advance over the “may contain”
obligation. A quick assessment reveals, however, that identity preservation, as a
concept and a practice, is more commonly associated with non-genetically
modiªed varieties of those crops where genetically modiªed varieties exist. The
idea of identity preservation is to ensure that a high-value crop (usually non-
GM, more rarely GM) is not contaminated with other GM or non-GM varie-
ties.26 The practice thus far is that identity preserving a non-GMO variety of a
heavily traded crop with GM varieties (such as soybean) makes economic sense
for exporting countries that wish to supply markets that desire non-GM soybean
(either for use in organic agriculture or because of other domestic imperatives).
Brazil is a classic example, whereby identity preservation may be undertaken to
supply guaranteed non-GM soya varieties to the EU or Japanese market.
The Protocol disclosure requirement, however, states that the “contain”
obligation is to apply to identity preserved GMO varieties. There are, however,
few of these to date, particularly in the ªrst generation of GM varieties, and
particularly in countries such as the US, where GM and non-GM varieties are
considered substantially equivalent, logically suggesting no reason to identity
preserve. Only those GM varieties that have special nutritionally altered charac-
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teristics (such as vitamin A enhanced “golden rice”—not yet commercialized or
traded) or other product characteristics (such as altered oil content or quality,
for example, high oleic soybean) would, from a market perspective, be worth-
while or necessary to identity preserve.27
As a result, where they do exist, such shipments are already marked as con-
taining the GMO variety in question and their production is often undertaken
under speciªc contract between producers and end users.28 In these cases, the
burden of testing and segregation for identity preserved crops is shouldered
(willingly) by exporters for market access reasons, given higher price premiums
that such crops command.29 If so, this component of disclosure is also market
following (as is the “may contain” obligation), rather than market forcing.
Notwithstanding their limited nature, are disclosure obligations being
complied with by exporting countries? Two points are noteworthy here. First,
many GMO exporting countries are not Parties to the Protocol and hence not le-
gally obliged to comply. They can only be compelled to do so if an importing
country’s domestic laws transpose or go beyond protocol disclosure obligations.
Second, given lack of national reporting from non-Parties and the divergent dis-
closure obligations on them (resulting from varying domestic rules of import-
ing countries), it is difªcult to ascertain what exporters are disclosing in general.
However, given its non-onerous nature, it is likely that most non-Parties are
willing and able to declare that shipments “may contain” GMOs (although un-
willing to permit more stringent disclosure obligations to be negotiated, even if
they are non-Parties and hence not legally obliged to comply). Thus, the point
remains that, even assuming full compliance, the current minimal globally
mandated disclosure in this realm reveals little that is useful to recipients and
has few material consequences for disclosers.
The discussion above suggests that disclosure in the Cartagena Protocol
does not place the burden on exporters to sufªciently inform importers about
GMO presence in the global commodity trade. If so, caveat emptor largely pre-
vails, with market developments shaping how fast and how far disclosure pro-
ceeds in this global realm, rather than disclosure obligations pushing market
developments. Meanwhile, with the onus of responsibility remaining on im-
porting countries to ferret out detailed and speciªc information about traded
GMOs, the focus in this global disclosure regime is now shifting to elaborate
sampling, detection, testing and veriªcation systems by which to monitor ship-
ments of bulk agricultural commodities with GM varieties. I turn to the implica-
tions of this development next.
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Making Transparency Work: Sampling, Detection, Veriªcation, Liability
Given the current scope of disclosure in this global regime, essentially revolving
around a “may contain” obligation, the focus has now decisively shifted to es-
tablishing infrastructures of sampling, testing, detection and veriªcation of
GMOs in the bulk commodity trade. Such “infrastructures of transparency” ap-
pear necessary, ªrst, to augment limited information currently disclosed; and
second, to verify accuracy of disclosed information (and such an imperative ex-
ists no matter how much information is disclosed—thus it will not lessen with
provision of more information). For these reasons, systems and practices of
sampling, testing and veriªcation are becoming ªxtures of governance of disclo-
sure in this domain.30
As a synthesis of country experiences makes clear, in recent years an entire
infrastructure of sampling, testing, and veriªcation for GMO transfers is indeed
emerging globally.31 For each of these components, complex, contested and un-
certain issues arise. For example, detection of GM content in food, feed and in
processed products looks set to become a key site where battles of knowing and
disclosing (and biosafety governance) are likely to be fought—notwithstanding
the image it evokes of an esoteric and technically complex activity conducted by
neutral scientists toiling in obscure laboratories. Its politically contested nature
is evident from an emerging transatlantic divide: two detection methods domi-
nate current GM testing, with one favored by the US and the other by the EU.
The US preferred method, protein testing, is relatively easy, cheap and quick but
imprecise; the EU preferred method, DNA testing, is technically complex, ex-
pensive and time-consuming but yields more precise results.32 Which of these is
endorsed as an appropriate (or adequate) method of detection is a key political
issue, given varying costs and consequences for exporters and importers in the
agricultural commodity trade.
Further complicating matters is the question of what “truths” are revealed
by sampling, testing and detection, i.e. reliability of information obtained via
testing. In discussing costs and technical challenges associated with GMO test-
ing, Kalaitzandonakes notes that, since GMO testing is
a statistical process, repeated sampling and testing of the very same cargo
[can] regularly produce different results. There are several sources of variance
in test results, including differences in testing and sampling methods as well
as testing error. Testing methods can vary appreciably across labs (. . .)
conºicting test results could occur even if identical lab testing protocols are
used, unless the same sample is tested. Depending on the concentration and
distribution of a particular LMO [living modiªed organism] in a particular
lot and how it was sampled, it could be difªcult, if not impossible, to dupli-
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cate any set of test results. Finally, some assay [sampling] error (e.g. false
positive or false negative test results) will always exist.33
With variations in test results and the specter of false positives and false nega-
tives hanging over such results, there can be signiªcant economic consequences
for all involved with a testing and veriªcation regime, depending upon how lia-
bility for error is distributed. Whose testing regimen is “sound” and whose
knowledge is reliable are key sites of conºict, which science alone cannot re-
solve.
Debates within the Protocol have thus also focused on standardization of
various elements of such infrastructures of transparency, such as standardized
sampling techniques, detection methods, and testing protocols.34 This also ap-
pears to be a looming battleground in biosafety governance, as evident from the
fact that the objectives pursued by standardization vary greatly. For GMO
exporters, the goal is to avoid proliferating national standards and develop min-
imum agreed global standards, so as to reduce potential liability claims or eco-
nomic harm resulting from diverging national practices or varying (unstandard-
ized) test results. For GMO importers, such as the EU with its stringent regional
labeling, thresholds and traceability requirements, the goal is global stan-
dards that reºect its preferred methods and approaches. An effort in the global
food safety standard setting body, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, to
achieve agreement on standardized testing and thresholds for GM food has
been stalled for a while,35 with similar debates now emerging in the context of
the Protocol.
These infrastructures of transparency are thus complex, expensive, prone
to error and a challenge to institutionalize on a global scale for GM varieties cur-
rently traded. Given this, what are the consequences of ever more varieties en-
tering the market, especially where each contains not one or two genetic
modiªcation “events” but rather multiple “stacked events,” each of which may
have to be tested for? So far, the norm is two or three stacked events in a given
GMO variety, and these pose substantial challenges for testing and detection.36
If we draw on analyses by transgenic crop advocates such as Clive James, a dili-
gent chronicler of the “progress” made by such crops in the last decade, it would
appear that we have only seen the tip of the iceberg with regard to stacked
events. As an illustration of progress, James states in bold type in a recent study
that
Smartstax™ is expected to be released in the USA in 2010 with eight different
genes coding for several pest resistant and herbicide tolerant traits. Future
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stacked crop products will comprise both agronomic input traits for pest
resistance, tolerance to herbicides and drought plus [a variety of] output
traits (. . .).37
Having to contend with this evokes science-ªction-like images of expanding
testing, detection and veriªcation systems struggling to cope, with the enormity
of the task daunting in all respects (political, technical and economic).
This discussion highlights another crucial aspect relating to infrastructures
of transparency: how these new and emerging loci of authority will function
and who they will empower. Clearly, detection techniques can also be a power-
ful tool for civil society and others seeking information, as evident from recent
StarLink and other controversies surrounding release of illegal GMO varieties
and their transfer internationally. In these cases, it was not state-run systems of
oversight that detected unauthorized GMOs in bulk shipments, but rather civil
society efforts.38 A key implication is that availability of simple detection tech-
niques, developed to support the practices of governance by disclosure, and per-
haps widely disseminated via the Protocol (through capacity building etc.), may
well force further disclosure and voluntarily change market practices. This is es-
pecially the case given the possibility that easily detected illegal presence of
GMOs may fuel liability claims and lost market access.
On the other hand, to detect presence of illegal and unapproved GMOs,
information about what to test for is still necessary. Certain types of disclosure
are thus required for a testing infrastructure itself to function. This includes ref-
erence materials and testing protocols for each GMO variety, information that
testers need in order to know what to test for. Such information, however, is of-
ten seen as proprietary and not widely available.39 Furthermore, as a CBD syn-
thesis report notes, “detection of unauthorized or unknown GMOs [is often not
possible] due to lack of molecular knowledge of their genetic contents.”40 This
highlights that the empowerment potential of these infrastructures of transpar-
ency remains up for grabs.
The discussion above also points to complex links between disclosure, the
burden of testing and future liability regimes. Liability discussions have been ex-
tremely contentious in these negotiations,41 not only because of concerns over
ecological or health-related damages resulting from GMO use, but also because
liability rules may fundamentally alter incentive structures relating to scope and
nature of information disclosure and testing and veriªcation.
For example, once liability regimes are in place, less precise tests may no
longer be an option, given the risk of being held liable for inaccurate informa-
tion. But on whom the onus for greater accuracy will rest remains unclear. It
might either shift the burden for testing onto exporting parties (the intent of
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those pushing for stringent liability in this context), or rather leave it on those
who currently need to comply with protocol obligations, and ensure accuracy of
their own stringent GMO labeling laws (mainly importing countries who are
Parties to the Protocol). These intricate links between disclosure and liability are
now increasingly coming to the fore.42
From the above discussion, two observations can be made. First, the grow-
ing need for sampling, testing and veriªcation represents, in this domain as in
many others, a “technicalization” of political conºict and creation of new epi-
stemic authorities, where particular forms of expertise are privileged over oth-
ers.43 These new loci of authority have the potential to reshape existing power
relationships, yet in what ways and how remains unclear. This is fundamentally
related to who has the capacity and need to establish such infrastructures, as
well as the power to shape associated practices and what Power calls “rituals of
veriªcation.”44
As Power notes, a key struggle is over competing claims to expertise. This is
especially the case, he suggests, where
the nature of the market and the competences to operate in it are ill-deªned
and immature. In such circumstances, even the driest and most procedural
elaboration (. . .) is not simply neutrally descriptive, it is part of a wider nor-
mative discourse which constructs and presents the ªeld in ways which
make it receptive to the claims of certain forms of expertise rather than an-
other.45
This applies to the newly emerging “market” for GMO sampling, detection, test-
ing, and veriªcation infrastructures and practices as well. The relevance and
functioning of governance by disclosure in this global realm will be shaped by
these infrastructures of testing and veriªcation and their architects, suggesting a
new locus of conºict and power in this realm.
Second, the discussion above suggests that this entire direction in global
biosafety governance (and governance by disclosure) has greater relevance for
some than others. Establishing infrastructures of transparency is more feasible
for the EU or Japan, New Zealand, Mexico and South Africa, where extensive ef-
forts are underway.46 It poses a far greater challenge for many developing coun-
tries, particularly in Africa. These countries thus continue to push for expanding
the scope of disclosed information in order to shift the onus of responsibility
for monitoring and testing onto exporting countries.47
With the current focus on infrastructures of disclosure, a clarion call for ca-
pacity building is also increasingly heard from all within this global governance
context. Yet, as the discussion above implies, the capacity to ensure biosafety
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and develop institutions and practices of sampling, testing and veriªcation
(and whose capacity is to be built by whom) cannot be separated from political
struggles over whose practices are considered reliable, accurate and trustworthy.48
In concluding, I brieºy consider the differing relevance of current disclo-
sure obligations and practices for GMO importing countries, depending on
varying domestic governance goals.
Transparency: for Whom and Why?
Drawing on the analysis above, I return here to a central aspect of governance by
disclosure: transparency for whom and to what end? In particular, I consider
who (among importing countries) most needs protocol-induced disclosure to
meet biosafety governance aims. Within the category of importing countries,
there are wide variations in existence and stringency of domestic biosafety laws.
These distinctions inºuence whether disclosure can further varied normative,
procedural and substantive governance aims in such countries. Key differences
lie in whether domestic GMO laws exist; and where they do, what they call for.
They might require only biosafety risk assessments, or also labeling of food with
GMO ingredients, with varying threshold levels triggering such labeling (that
may require more or less precise information). Most stringently, some laws may
call for traceability of GMOs from farm to fork.49
Countries with the most stringent domestic regulations in place, such as
those in the European Union, require detailed information disclosure as well as
guaranteed traceability from exporting countries in order to implement domes-
tic regulations. Yet these countries are precisely the ones who least need such
disclosure to be globally-induced via the Protocol, since exporting countries
have to automatically comply with such importing country regulations. This
holds for all countries with domestic laws that require labeling of GM food or
food containing GM ingredients, which includes countries like Brazil, China,
New Zealand, Mexico and Japan.50
It is countries with no domestic regulatory frameworks, mostly developing
countries in Africa or elsewhere, or those where such frameworks are only now
being developed, that globally-induced disclosure through the Protocol (and its
scope) is of greatest relevance. This is because it is the only available avenue
through which to impose disclosure on exporting countries. For these countries,
the main goal is one of a right to know (as much as feasible), rather than imple-
menting stringent labeling or traceability, particularly given the low prospects
for achieving domestic segregation and co-existence of GM and non-GM agri-
cultural systems.51
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For these countries, the central consideration remains whether protocol-
induced disclosure can shift the burden to exporting countries to sufªciently in-
form importing countries of impending GMO transfers, and their goal all along
has been to engineer such a shift. As explored earlier, however, a “may contain”
disclosure requirement does not accomplish this, with the emphasis now shift-
ing to sampling, testing, and veriªcation in order to either generate additional
and/or put limited disclosed information to use.
This raises the question whether governance by disclosure (and its associ-
ated testing, segregation, identity preservation and coexistence approach to
biosafety) is even a suitable choice in this area, and for whom. With the huge
challenges it poses for the poorest developing countries, and in the absence of
speciªc and stringent disclosure via the Protocol, many such countries have
chosen to impose bans or moratoria on entry of GMOs. Arguably, this is simpler
and quicker than developing domestic biosafety laws and an easy way to shift
the burden to exporters to comply with such a ban, while removing the need to
set up elaborate infrastructures of testing and veriªcation to detect presence of
speciªc GMOs in incoming shipments. Countries with a ban on imports of
GMOs (in food aid or as unprocessed grain) include Algeria, Angola, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia and Zim-
babwe.52 It is also striking—but supports the argument here—that many bans
are recent, notwithstanding the Cartagena Protocol and its disclosure
obligations.
Another compelling imperative to institute bans is that, for many of the
poorest countries, GMO governance is related not (only) to labeling, consumer
choice or food safety, but to the essential need for continued access to EU and
other markets for non-GM traditional agricultural exports that may be threat-
ened by inadvertent co-mingling with GM varieties. Since, as industry advocates
for GM crops argue, co-mingling is a technical and political reality in the current
marketplace and segregation is very costly, it is difªcult to simultaneously argue
that segregation (as a way to secure non-GM markets) will be a feasible option
for poorer countries.53
The above discussion makes clear that disclosure has differing relevance
for different importing countries, highlighting that “transparency for whom”
remains a central issue in assessing governance by disclosure. The analysis
suggests that globally-induced disclosure is most needed by those with the least
capacity to develop domestic regulations and hence to inform themselves via
such a route. For these countries, a key imperative is to globalize “a right to
be told” rather than simply a “right to know” (because with the latter alone,
the burden of testing and veriªcation may not be shifted to those disclosing
information).54
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Conclusion: Transparency’s Transformative Potential?
In concluding, I return to the question of transparency’s transformative poten-
tial and the prospects for governance by disclosure to meet various normative,
procedural and substantive ends. As I have argued above, the Cartagena Proto-
col’s disclosure obligations and practices relating to the agricultural commodity
trade ensure that, rather than institutionalizing a normative right to know and
choose, a dictum of caveat emptor prevails instead. Furthermore, in the absence
of supportive domestic regulations, such disclosure leaves the onus upon im-
porting countries to detect, verify and make useable disclosed information, and
to do so by putting into place complex infrastructures of monitoring, detecting
and veriªcation.
Debates in the global context have now shifted to standardization of sam-
pling criteria, appropriate detection methods, and availability of testing proto-
cols. These debates reºect divergent EU-US approaches to detection and testing,
and broader disputes over facilitating trade versus meeting stringent domestic
labeling and traceability laws. Disclosure in the Cartagena Protocol, particularly
relating to the GMO commodity trade, is thus yet another global arena where
these transatlantic conºicts play out.
Neither facilitating GMO trade nor implementing stringent labeling and
traceability requirements is a compelling imperative yet for the vast majority of
the South. For these countries, the driving imperative remains shifting the bur-
den of providing information and soliciting consent with regard to incoming
GMO varieties to exporters. In the absence of this, they have to contend with a
caveat emptor status quo. In response, some have instituted moratoria or bans,
partly because of the technical complexity and enormous costs of alternative
routes such as stringent labeling and traceability (the path taken by the EU) and
related efforts to realize co-existence of conventional, GM and organic agricul-
ture.55 With this, however, the compromise of prior informed consent (to pre-
vent the two extremes of caveat emptor or outright bans) fails to take effect.
Transparency arguably fails to fulªll its transformative potential here.
Where, then, does that leave governance by disclosure and its potential to em-
power? In analyzing how disclosure is working (and where it is failing), my ar-
gument here is not that the Cartagena Protocol is irrelevant. Indeed, it has had a
range of desired effects, including general awareness-raising, as well as empow-
ering domestic constituencies supportive of biosafety concerns and the precau-
tionary principle relating to GMO crop use.56 As it currently stands, however, its
disclosure obligations beneªt least those who might need them the most. In
contrast to an impetus for disclosure grounded in the normative demand of
48 • Transparency as Contested Political Terrain
mation they desire at their disposal, a disclosure approach to biosafety may not secure their
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56. Falkner and Gupta 2009.
some of the poorest countries to be informed about GMO transfers, it is these
countries that are left by the wayside in complex discussions about detection
and thresholds that now dominate in this global governance arena.
Two alternative lines of argument can be entertained in considering future
prospects for governance by disclosure. First, the critical perspective adopted
here would imply that transparency—like all other governance norms and
mechanisms—will inevitably mirror broader meta-normative and political eco-
nomic conºicts, and will acquire meaning and relevance in this broader con-
text.57 In such a view, since transparency is itself an arena for articulation of such
broader conºicts, it cannot simultaneously offer the means by which to tran-
scend them. If so, a transformative role for transparency is perhaps too much to
hope for.
A second perspective sees the possibility of a more dialectical relationship
between transparency and the larger political-normative context within which it
is embedded. In such a view, transparency is not only shaped by the meta-
normative and political context but also has the ability to shape it in turn.58 If
so, the prospects for empowerment through transparency remain alive, since
global norms evolve and are mutable.59 For such a perspective, a key analytical
challenge remains to illustrate conditions under which transparency can indeed
be transformative.
With regard to GMO governance, a striking veil of unknowability hangs
over future normative and political developments. Given the anticipatory na-
ture of this governance challenge, it is not clear how markets for GM and non-
GM crops will develop, which crops will be approved and win acceptance (or
not) in key markets, how norms of risk and choice will evolve, and who will be
empowered by emerging systems and practices of testing, sampling and veriªca-
tion. Thus, even if caveat emptor currently prevails, the shifting normative and
political context within which it does so ensures its precarious status. What fol-
lows in its wake is not a foregone conclusion. It is clear, however, is that trans-
parency and disclosure will, for better or worse, become an ever more important
battleground in global risk governance.
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